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BOOK REVIEWS
THE COmmERCE PowER vERsus STATES RIGHTS. By Edward S. Corwin.
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1936. Pp. xiv, 276.
It seems most appropriate that I should be starting to give formal ex-
pression to the thoughts engendered by this little volume on the very eve-
ning that the press brings to us the news of a presidential proposal for
federal judicial reform envisaging the intromission of new members to the
Supreme Court. For whatever measure of support this suggestion may in
the end command, we may be sure that its genesis is due to deep-seated
conviction in many quarters that heretical doctrines have governed the
majority of the Court in some of the more significant decisions of the past
quarter-century. Taking as his slogan "Back to the Constitution," Profes-
sor Corwin appears as the champion of those who bring the accusation of
heresy.
The argument is strikingly and efficiently presented. In his opening
chapter, Professor Corwin presents the contrast between Gibbons v. Ogden'
and Hammer v. Dagenhart,2 pointedly asking, "How come?" Our author,
of course, does not descend to the vernacular. His query is, "How did the
Court ever get from the one to the other-what were the steps?" But the
more expressive provincialism comes much closer to representing the startled
surprise with which he feels we should gaze upon the result of this "century
of progress" in judicial interpretation of the Constitution. The "doctrinal
antecedents"3 of the later decision he puts in the form of six propositions
which have been advanced from time to time. To the demolition of these
propositions th6-major portion of the volume is devoted. The work is thor-
oughly and completely done, with a painstaking analysis and a laborious
historical investigation from which every trace of flippant detraction or
carping criticism is absent.
To me it seems difficult to say that Professor Corwin does not prove his
case. Opinions, of course, will differ upon so controversial a point, and
every reader must weigh the argument in the scales of his own reason by
the weights of the available data. But the framers of the Constitution have
told us in the preamble that their purpose was to secure the blessings of
liberty not to themselves alone but to their posterity, through the govern-
ment which they established. To preserve liberty, a governmental organiza-
tion must be strong enough to combat effectively every combination by which
freedom may be menaced. A structure in which regulatory power over
some of the most consequential areas of human activity is paralyzed, not by
express constitutional provisions but by vague implications, hardly can be
an efficient defender of freedom against strong organizations which may
build themselves cities of refuge in the no-man's land of "dual federalism."
Must we believe that the fathers of our nation intended such a result?
1. 9 Wheat. 1 (1824).
2. 247 U. S. 251 (1918).
3. P. 18.
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Whatever his views as to the correct interpretation of the Constitution,
no student of our public law can afford to ignore the argument presented
by Professor Corwin. The book should be read and pondered by every
lawyer and law student. Those who are convinced by his presentation will
find themselves confronted by yet another question: What can be done
about it? It is significant that our author is distrustful of the effectiveness
of "the gross, fumbling hand of Amendment," 4 and urges that "we must
still trust the Court, as we have so largely in the past, to correct its own
errors," a trust which he tells us has been "justified by the event."5
Norman, Oklahoma. MAURICE H. MERRILL.
SUBSIDIARIES AND AFFILATED CORPORATIONS. By Elvin R. Latty. Chi-
cago: The Foundation Press, Inc., 1936. Pp. xxvii, 225.
To a now substantial segment of the legal profession, analysis and pre-
diction of judicial behavior in conceptual terms is suspect. Concept-smash-
ing is no longer news. Indeed, so far has the process developed, so prosaic
has it became, that its purpose and limitations have become obscured. Some
persons have ignorantly projected the process far beyond its reasonable
scope. These persons have observed that lawyers and judges talk in con-
cepts and that these concepts can be smashed, and they have proceeded to
ridicule any ordered attempt to investigate and interpret those portions of
human behavior with which the lawyer and judge are familiar.
Generally, there has been a great deal of concept-smashing, but very
little use has been made of the virgin material disclosed by the process.
It was fairly easy to indicate, after conventional concepts were smashed,
that judges decide cases on the basis of hunches. It was even possible plaus-
ibly to define the hunches in terms of the judge's digestion and economic
background, variously weighted. In addition, a few persons have proceeded
from smashed concepts to an explanation of judicial behavior in terms of
psychology or folk-ways. It has not been possible, apparently, to define
these terms or to test their applicability and utility in any field with which
the law is concerned; or the persons who have submitted these explanations
have been so ignorant of relevant areas of conduct as to be unable to make
a convincing effort. This more erudite-sounding explanation, therefore, has
been little more satisfactory than the "hunch" theory.
A few persons have made a systematic endeavor to develop a method of
utilizing the facts and behavior that remain after conceptualism is smashed.
Notable among these is Underhill Moore. And notable also is the work
that has been done in the field of vicarious liability. Particularly deserving
of mention in this connection are the law review articles on the subject by
William 0. Douglas. In these articles conventional concepts used in talking
about vicarious liability for the purpose of dealing with legal issues are
smashed. But Mr. Douglas does not rest with performance of that useful
4. P. 265.
5. Ibid.
t Professor of Law, University of Oklahoma.
1937]
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol22/iss3/8
